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The current wave of PPPs in developing economies was not determined by an endogenous 
process;  on  the  contrary,  it  was  due  to  a  coincidence  of  interests  between  international 
organizations that shared the view of the Washington Consensus and a set of countries that 
have considered divestiture the best way to alleviate the public deficit constraints. After the 
euphoria  of  the  middle  1990s,  some  disenchantment  about  the  capacity  of  PPI  policy  to 
overcome the existent big gaps between high-income countries and developing economies 
appeared. Although a high interconnection between foreign companies and domestic firms 
has  resulted  from  PPI  policy,  and  this  interrelationship  has  allowed  an  expansion  and 
upgrading of some domestic firms in developing economies; these economies go on being 
characterized by a lack of institutional capacity, weak governance systems, and unclear or 
unsuitable rules and regulations, all of which increase transaction costs and risks, making PPI 
arrangements more ineffective in practice than in theory. In the meanwhile, poor people in 
poorer countries caught in poverty traps need to be served and the rationale underling the PPI 
approach cannot give a positive answer to these people. Here, the government and the ODA 
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*  The  present  draft  has  been  prepared  for  publication  as  Chapter  26  in  International  Handbook  on  Public-
Private-Partnerships (PPPs) edited by Hodge, Greve and Boardman, Edward Elgar publishing.   2 




This  paper  aims  to  appraise  the  PPP  performance  and  to  anticipate  the  PPP-related 
prospective crucial issues in developing economies. This is a very difficult task not only 
because there is large controversy about what PPPs are — and what PPPs must be — but also 
because  developing  economies  are  a  heterogeneous  universe  without  a  unique  evolution 
pattern. Although this is not the right place to take in hand either the debate about the PPP 
concept or the determinants of the current wave of private participation in public services, it is 
true that the way such wave emerged certainly conditions PPP performance. Therefore, in the 
next section we’ll deal with the sources of the contemporary wave of PPPs in developing 
economies and with the advantages that allegedly they have as instruments that can contribute 
to more quickly solve the development gap. 
However, the required evaluation must be context specific. There is abundant literature about 
evaluation  of  PPPs (mainly  as VfM), but  this is of  little help for our purpose. Not only 
because, on the one hand, it refers to developed countries
1 and it is not conclusive (Hodge and 
Greve, 2009), on the other hand, our purpose is to evaluate PPPs in the context of developing 
countries, and these have specificities which can make a significant difference (Pessoa, 2006). 
So, in section 3 we’ll deal both with the universe of developing economies and with the most 
frequent justification for the reform towards a higher participation of the private sector in 
providing goods that formerly were considered public: the scarcity of public funds confronted 
with the huge infrastructure gap in developing economies.  
As any other evaluation, the evaluation of PPP performance can be affected by controversy, it 
therefore  must  be  clear-headed  and,  so,  a  solid  ground  to  base  it  on  is  needed.  As  the 
development gap is overwhelming both in infrastructure and in social services like education 
and  health,  and  given  that  theoretically  PPPs  can  be  used  both  in  social  services  and 
infrastructure, why are PPPs mostly referred to infrastructure? Although answering to this 
question  would  be  interesting,  our  analysis  is  only  about  infrastructure  for  two  explicit 
reasons:  firstly,  because  there  is  some  path  dependency  on  this  issue  —  PPPs  have 
increasingly been considered as exclusively referred to private participation in infrastructure; 
                                                
1 For instance, none of the 25 studies about PPP evaluation reviewed in Hodge and Greve (2009, Table 1), is 
referred to developing economies.   3 
secondly, because the scarce data available are referred to PPPs in infrastructure services
2. So, 
we’ll limit our analysis to the private participation in infrastructure, using data of the World 
Bank databases: the WDI (World development indicators) and PPI (private participation in 
infrastructure) database on PPPs. The data analysis is carried out in section 4. 
In a PPP, a sustained collaborative effort in order to attain a common objective is assumed. 
On  the  other  hand,  one  important  indicator  of  the  failure  of  a  PPP  is  the  degree  of 
dissatisfaction of populations covered by such arrangement. Sometimes this disappointment 
causes the unexpected end of the PPP. However, the cessation before the contractual end of 
the PPP project usually results from divergences between partners. These divergences can be 
originated on a multitude of factors but they always indicate problems in the design of the 
contractual arrangement or in its functioning conditions. Whatever the situation, termination 
before the contractual end is always a factor that increases the costs or decreases the potential 
benefits of PPPs. Section 5 thus deals with the cancellation of PPP arrangements.  
If evaluation is not easy, anticipating future crucial issues is even more demanding. because 
we  are  facing  reforms  that  correspond  to  pendulum  movements,  inserted  in  dependency 
relationships. Section 6 will draw some conclusions, which can be useful to speculate about 
prospective PPP related issues.  
 
2. The current wave of PPPs in developing economies  
It is well known that since the 1980s the capacity of governments to provide public services 
on their own in an effective and efficient way is being questioned. This point of view calls 
attention  to  both  the  invariably  inadequate  government  resources  and  the  quality  and 
efficiency of the services they offer (World Bank, 1994, 1995; Ferreira and Khatami, 1996). 
Additionally, the arguments provided by the NPM (New Public Management) that traditional 
public services are ineffective in resource allocation and poor in management (see, e.g. Hood, 
1991; Boston, 1996; Minouge et al., 1998; Polidano, 1999) have contributed to the above 
heated discussion. Furthermore, it has been highlighted that the public sector does not need to 
compete because it is often the only provider of services, thus lacking incentive to improve 
                                                
2 In spite of the existence of some studies trying to construct infrastructure database (Canning, 1998; Estache 
and Goicoechea, 2005), there is a lack of available and credible data on infrastructures in developing economies. 
As is recognized by the Spence Commission (World Bank, 2008, p. 139), “given the importance of infrastructure 
for long-term growth and inclusiveness, available data are surprisingly hard to obtain”. Although this is true, data 
on  collaboration  between  the  public  and  the  private  sector  in  health  and  education  services  is hugely  more 
difficult to obtain.   4 
quality. As a result of all the aforementioned ideas, there is a strong belief that if the services 
are provided directly by government they will deteriorate over time, unless a reform occurs 
which will alleviate the bureaucratic procedures and give the public sector the capacity to act 
quickly to adapt to change. Consequently, by the late 1980s private sector financing began to 
be viewed as the most promising avenue to explore with regard to providing public goods, 
and in the funding of infrastructure development.  
This reform began in developed countries, partly owing to internal political beliefs, as in the 
UK, and partly influenced by the European Commission
3. It was soon extended to developing 
economies, to some extent by pressure of international organizations that shared the view of 
the “Washington Consensus”
4, which includes within its ten principles the reorientation of 
public  expenditures  and  privatisation  (Pessoa,  2004;  Rodrik,  2006).  Using  this  rationale, 
international funding agencies such as the World Bank had insisted on the advisability of 
“using markets in infrastructure provision” (World Bank, 1994; 1995). 
Although these reforms were influenced by the NPM with approaches such as the outsourcing 
or subcontracting of functions, competition and charging for services, they were also usually 
connected with a new role to the Official Development Aid (ODA), adopted in reaction to the 
emerging recognition that conventional support to public providers through loans for capital 
investment  has  not  achieved  the  desired  results  in  reducing  poverty  (Pessoa,  2008a). 
Consequently,  this  new  set  of  reforms  relies  on  public-private  partnerships  as  a  policy 
instrument to attain multiple purposes including adequate infrastructure, improving welfare, 
enhancing efficiency, and so on (United Nations, 2002).  
On the other hand, the observation that the developing world needs far more financing for 
infrastructure than can be provided by domestic public finances alone and through ODA was 
an important motivation, too (Ferreira and Khatami, 1996; Hammami et al., 2006; ADB, 
2009). The cost of maintaining existing infrastructure and undertaking necessary extensions 
of its coverage is estimated  by OECD (2005) at 7 per cent of developing country GDP, 
equivalent to about 600 billion US dollars (USD) per year
5. However, public spending on 
                                                
3 By the late 1990s, the European Commission had advocated explicitly the use of public-private partnerships 
(PPPs) to fund Trans-European Network projects. See the communication (COM 97/453) issued regarding such 
partnerships  by  the  European  Commission,  on  10  September  1997.  More  recently,  the  European  Growth 
Initiative approved by the European Council in December 2003, set as one of its objectives to promote the use of 
PPPs, notably in order to develop growth-related infrastructures.  
4 John Williamson coins the name “Washington Consensus” in 1989. See Williamson (1990). 
5 According to a first estimation made by Fay and Yepes (2003) “The infrastructure (except ports, airports and 
canals) investment needed should amount to about $465 billion per annum or 5.5% of developing countries'   5 
infrastructure in developing countries is now around 3 per cent. Given the scarcity of public 
funds in most developing countries, the obvious solution is to invite greater private sector 
participation, enlarging the use of public-private agreements in infrastructure and relying on 
ODA to enhance the quality of projects, reduce risks and raise profitability.  
Such  public-private  agreements  were  responsible  for  USD  1,255  billion  in  infrastructure 
investments between 1990 and 2007 (PPI database). Some of this money obviously came 
from public finances, with the private sector having nevertheless contributed significantly to 
infrastructure development over the period – according to OECD (2005) far in excess of what 
governments  could  have  financed  on  their  own  –  and  assumed  several  of  the  risks  (e.g. 
commercial  and  currency  risk)  that  would  otherwise  have  occurred  in  the  public  sector 
(OECD, 2005).  
Some points must therefore be retained: first, the movement towards PPPs in developing 
economies began as not an exclusively endogenous process. It was advised and propelled by 
international organizations under a controversial set of guidelines known as the “Washington 
Consensus”. Second, the most used argument advocating PPPs is that the developing world 
needs far more financing for infrastructure than can be provided by domestic public finances. 
However, it is far from certain whether this should be a driver for PPPs in itself, because as is 
recognised by the European Investment Bank (EIB, 2005, p. 11) “In a PPP, the private-sector 
Provider needs to be paid – either by end-users through real tolls, or by the public-sector 
Promoter through shadow tolls, asset availability fees, etc. These payments have to cover the 
costs of funding the project, plus Operating and Maintenance (O&M) costs”.  
 
3. The specificity of developing economies 
For practical purposes one can classify economies according to relative GDP per capita. The 
World  Bank,  for  instance  classifies  economies  into  basically  three  groups:  Low  Income, 
Middle Income and High-income countries
6. Henceforth we’ll consider developing economies 
as the set composed of Low Income and Middle Income economies. As a whole, Low Income 
and Middle Income countries produce 26% of world GDP (current US$), but they correspond 
to 74% of the world surface and 84% of the world population (WDI, 2009). This makes some 
                                                                                                                                                   
GDP over 2005-2010”. In these estimates resources that might be needed for rehabilitation or for upgrading are 
not included. 
6 In the most recent classification Economies are divided according to 2008 GNI per capita using the World 
Bank Atlas method. The groups are: low income, $975 or less; lower middle income, $976 - $3,855; upper 
middle income, $3,856 - $11,905; and high income, $11,906 or more.   6 
comments opportune: firstly, this is a large potential market not only for its domestic firms 
but also for companies worldwide; secondly, given the shortage of domestic savings in most 
developing  countries  international  financing  must  be  called  to  play  a  role  (Ferreira  and 
Khatami, 1996). 
Table  1  presents  some  illustrative  figures  following  the  WDI  (World  Development 
Indicators), and it divides the developing economies in six geographic regions: EAP (East 
Asia and Pacific), ECA (Europe and Central Asia), LAC (Latin America and the Caribbean), 
MENA (Middle East and North Africa), SA (South Asia), and SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa). To 
discriminate the developing economies in those six regions evidences the differences between 
each  other.  Of  course,  regions  themselves  are  not  homogeneous:  there  are  important 
differences between rural and urban areas and these differences are typically higher than in 
developed countries. For instance, in SSA where the rate of population growth is the highest 
in the world, while population has increased at a 1.9 percent annual rate in rural regions, such 
rate amounts to 4 percent in urban areas. Another example is equally significant: In 2006, in 
this  region  while  57  percent  of  the  urban  population  had  access  to  improved  sanitation 
facilities, such access only existed for 23 percent of the rural population (WDI, 2009). This 
confirms  the  above  noted  high  potential  market  for  infrastructure,  and  particularly  for 
urbanization-pulled infrastructure and utilities.  
 
Table 1.  





























% ages 15-49 
2007 
 
Region:               
EAP   16,299  1,912  1.3  72  27  13  0.2 
ECA   23,972  446  0.4  70  23  …  0.6 
LAC   20,421  561  1.7  73  26  4  0.5 
MENA   8,778  313  2.3  70  38  …  0.1 
SA   5,140  1,522  1.9  64  78  41  0.3 
SSA  24,242  800  2.7  51  146  27  5.0 
Source: Based on World Bank (2009).  
 
As shown in table 1, given the vast surface area, the huge amount of population and, above all 
the  growth  rate  of  population,  developing  economies  face  important  needs  in  terms  of 
provision  of  infrastructure  services.  With  the  exception  of  ECA,  where  the  demographic 
transition was completed long ago, the high rates of population growth exert an increasing 
pressure  on  the  supply  of  social  and  infrastructure  services,  significantly  higher  than  in 
developed countries. Moreover, the increasing rates of urbanization force the building of new   7 
infrastructure
7. However, table 1 also shows that in social services, as health and education, 
the  need  for  provision  is  not  less  urgent  than  the  lack  of  infrastructure.  To  this  general 
characteristic, some particularities must be added: the level of child malnutrition, the under-5 
years mortality rate, the prevalence of HIV and, consequently, the life expectancy at birth, all 
the impoverished health conditions, especially in SSA
8.  
Moreover,  even  in  economies  that  have  registered  large  improvements  in  health  and 
education, significant gaps remain. The example of South Asia helps to elucidate this point. 
Extreme poverty declined from 52 percent in 1990 to 40 percent in 2005. In spite of this 
success, the number of poor people increased and the region remains home to the largest 
number of extremely poor people: nearly 600 million in 2005. The region has made large 
improvements in education: the primary education completion rate rose from 62 percent in 
1991 to 80 percent in 2006 and the ratio of girls to boys in secondary education improved 
from 59 percent to 84 percent between 1991 and 2005 (World Bank, 2009). In spite of these 
improvements, SA has not yet attained universal primary education, a goal that was achieved 
by high-income countries a long time ago. To the gaps in social services mentioned above, the 
paucity of infrastructure can be added, as the Asia Development Bank observes: “globally, 1.1 
billion people lack adequate access to clean water, 2.4 billion lack adequate sanitation, 4.0 
billion lack sound wastewater disposal systems, and 2.0 billion lack electric power” (ADB, 
2009, p. 2). 
Consequently,  the  amount  of  resources  needed  in  order  to  undertake  the  necessary 
improvements  in  health  and  education  conditions  and  in  infrastructure  to  overcome  the 
development gap is extremely high. Given the level of income creation in these countries and 
the scarcity of public funds, the obvious solution seems to be to invite greater private sector 
participation,  enlarging  the  use  of  public-private  agreements  in  social  and  infrastructure 
services.  Perhaps  authorities  in  developing  economies  consider  that  there  is  a  trade-off 
between social services and infrastructures, and that infrastructure has higher linkages with 
economic development than social services. Whatever the reason, the fact is that the existence 
of PPPs appears most popular in building, operating and maintaining infrastructure than in 
providing for social services.  
                                                
7 Even if the poorest regions, SA and SSA, remain predominantly rural, rapid urbanization has put significant 
pressure on urban services and infrastructures. 
8 Of course, there are differences among regions. For instance, the access to improved sanitation facilities is in 
short supply above all in SA and SSA, and the prevalence of HIV is particularly high in SSA. But, even in 
regions with less unfavourable indicators there is a huge gap to overcome in the road to development.    8 
4. PPPs in infrastructure services: the available data  
4.1. PPPs and infrastructure services 
It is well established that there are growing demands of social services and infrastructure in 
developing  economies.  Given  the  also  recognized  constraints  on  public  resources  in 
developing countries, a call for larger private sector involvement in the provision of both 
services of social sector (education, health care) and of infrastructure and utilities through 
PPPs seems to be at least part of the solution (Pessoa, 2006, 2008a).  
However, the way the private sector has been called to participate in reducing the short supply 
of social services has been very different from the one used in infrastructure services. There 
are two noteworthy differences: in the former, NGOs
9 have had a more important role; in the 
latter  the  key  intervention  is  from  foreign  for-profit  companies,  and  particularly  MNCs 
(multinational companies) coming from OECD countries. But, above all, private participation 
in  infrastructure  services  is  associated  to  a  higher  level  of  private  investment,  which  is 
conducive to more formal arrangements and, consequently, leads to lesser scarcity of empiric 
data to work with. So, although there are a wide variety of public-private partnerships in 
developing economies, when one uses the expression PPP what is usually called to mind is 
the private sector participation in infrastructure services. This is also the reason why this 
chapter is only focussed on infrastructure and utilities arrangements.  
While there is an abundant literature about PPP definitions (Bovaird, 2004; Hodge and Greve, 
2007), “few people agree on what a PPP actually is” (Hodge and Greve, 2009, p. 33), partly 
because  there  are  many  uses  for  the  PPP  concept  (Hodge  and  Greve,  2007).  Elsewhere 
(Pessoa, 2006), we have defined PPP as a sustained collaborative effort between the public 
sector and the private sector (including not-for-profit organizations) to achieve a common 
objective while both players pursue their own individual interests. This is a general definition 
that attempts to include different types of PPP families. However, our purpose in this chapter 
is primarily focused on policy instruments that broadly coincide with a particular PPP family: 
the  “Long-term  infrastructure contracts (LTICs)”, as named by Hodge and Greve (2007). 
Thus, a PPP is here identified with any sustained arrangement between a public sector party 
and a private sector party whereby the private sector assumes total or partial responsibility for 
infrastructure planning, financing, design, construction, operation, and maintenance, against 
                                                
9 In Health, for instance a Swiss NGO, Foundation PH, is dedicated to Partnerships in Health, providing health 
education  and  training  for  the  countries  of  Eastern  Europe  and  Central  Asia  (see, 
http://www.partnershipsinhealth.ch).  For  an  overview  on  PPPs  in  the  education  sector,  see  the  examples 
provided by Pessoa (2008b).   9 
the possibility of collecting payments from the users or/and from the public sector party. This 
may be considered a restrictive definition, because it considers a PPP as an instrument rather 
than a social phenomenon but it is sufficiently operative for our purpose: to confront the 
available data with the alleged goals of governments and international financing organizations 
which view PPPs as the best way to solve or reduce the development gap.  
Therefore,  PPPs  in infrastructure and  utilities are  understood as  projects with the private 
sector  participation  in  four  areas of economic activity with some monopoly or  oligopoly 
characteristics
10: energy (generation of electricity; transmission and distribution of electricity 
and  natural  gas),  telecommunications  (telephony,  both  fixed  or  mobile  and  domestic  or 
international),  transport  (airports,  railways,  toll  roads,  port  infrastructures),  and  water 
(generation and distribution of potable water and collection and treatment of sewerage). In 
these sectors, the number of PPP projects and the total investment commitments to such 
projects have had an uneven evolution in the last two decades with periods of expansion and 
slowdown, as depicted in figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  

















Source: Based on PPI database. 
 
In effect, according to data from the Private Participation in Infrastructure Project Database
11, 
from 1990 to 2007, 140 developing countries implemented at least 4,111 projects with private 
                                                
10 More competitive activities, such as airlines and gas production, are not included. 
11This database (hereafter PPI database) collects and disseminates information on infrastructure projects with 
private participation in low- and middle-income countries. The PPI Database is a joint product of the World 
Bank’s  Infrastructure  Economics  and  Finance  Department  and  the  Public-Private  Infrastructure  Advisory 
Facility (PPIAF). The PPI Project Database collects information from publicly available sources and includes 
transactions worth $1 million or more or, in water and electricity distribution, transactions that would provide 






























































































































Total Investment  10 
participation  (hereafter,  PPI  projects),  involving  investment  commitments  (henceforth, 
investment) of more than 1,255,613 million US$. As figure 1 shows, there is not a linear trend 
both in the number of PPI projects and the investment volume they have associated. Why is 
there a sharp increase in investment until 1997, and a decreasing trend from 1997 to 2002? 
Are  these  PPI  projects  evenly  distributed  across  infrastructure  sectors?  Are  they  equally 
distributed across geographic regions? Do these projects depend on the country’s level of 
development? The assessment of the performance of PPIs in developing economies calls for 
answers to these questions. 
 
4.2. Distribution across infrastructure sectors 
Looking at the economic activity, it is apparent from table 2 that, the bulk of investment was 
directed to telecommunications, which accounted for 49% of the cumulative investment in 
1990-2007, although the highest number of projects corresponds to energy, with particular 
emphasis  to  electricity.  The  technological  change  verified  in  telecommunications  has 
contributed to this leading position, reducing sunk costs and diminishing the barriers to entry.  
 
Table 2.  
PPI by area of economic activity 
Primary 
Sector    Project Counts  Total Investment  Investment per 
project 
  Subsector  Number  Percent  Million USD  Percent  Million USD 
Electricity  1,261  30.82  315,132  25.35  250 
Natural Gas  328  8.02  55,974  4.50  171 
Energy 
Total  1,589  38.83  371,106  29.86  234 
Telecom  Telecom  807  19.72  604,811  48.66  749 
Airports  128  3.13  30,580  2.46  239 
Railroads  100  2.44  38,891  3.13  389 
Roads  546  13.34  99,754  8.03  183 
Seaports  325  7.94  41,696  3.35  128 
Transport 
Total  1,099  26.86  210,921  16.97  192 
Treatment 
plant  316  7.72  12,461  1.00  39 
Utility  281  6.87  43,705  3.52  156 
Water and 
sewerage 
Total  597  14.59  56,166  4.52  94 
Total    4,092  100  1,243,004  100  304 
Source: Based on PPI Database. 
 
However the technological change was not the sole cause: the big wave of privatization in the 
sense  of assets selling  has  also played  a significant role. In  fact, there  was  a significant   11 
amount of assets to be sold in Latin America as a consequence of policies following the 
“Washington Consensus” and in ECA resulting from the disintegration of the former Soviet 
Union. 
Energy, which includes electricity and the distribution of natural gas, attracted the second 
largest  share  of  investment,  accounting  for  30%  of  the  cumulative  investment  in  private 
infrastructure projects. In contrast, private participation in the water and sewerage sector has 
been limited, accounting for 5% of cumulative investments over the same period. The scarce 
amount  of  private  involvement  in  water  and  sewerage  is  likely  to  reflect  the  “inherent 
difficulties” that face reforms in this sector, “in terms of the technology of water provision 
and the nature of the product” (Pessoa, 2008a, p. 319), but above all it reveals the scarce 
private investment in water treatment plants. 
This scarcity of investment in water and sewerage sector has many causes. As Hammami et 
al. (2006, p. 5) have shown ‘private sector decisions to commit resources are a function of the 
expected marketability of the goods and services, the technology required, and the degree of 
“impurity” of the goods or services’. The services supplied by the water and sewerage sector 
are usually viewed as public goods and this characteristic affects the way consumers react to 
reforms that increase the private participation in the sector, moreover reforms that sell assets 
to the private sector or that put private companies to collect tariffs from consumers. So, the 
public good characteristics of this sector explain the political and social opposition to such 
type of reforms, and also at least partly justify the scarce willingness to invest in the water and 
sewerage sector.  
Additionally, other factors contribute to the low motivation to invest in the water sector
12: i) 
water supply and sewerage services constitute a natural monopoly and so competition in the 
sector  is  limited;  ii)  the  underground  assets  are  difficult  to  assess,  introducing  much 
uncertainty in investment plans; iii) the sector as a whole is plagued with entrenched social 
and cultural issues (Marin, 2009) and consequent threat of riots; and iv) the historical level of 
residential water tariffs, which in most countries do not consider any cost recovery, does not 
allow the use of PPP modalities that involve assumption of demand risk by the private party, 
as is recognized by the ADB (2009). 
Recognizing the specificities of the water sector, some consider that the main focus of water 
PPPs should not be about attracting direct private investment, but rather about using private 
                                                
12 These factors can also explain why projects in the water and sewerage sector have the highest tendency to 
cancellation (see, Harris and Pratap, 2008).   12 
operators to improve service quality and efficiency (Marin, 2009). Although concessions have 
worked in a few places, contractual arrangements that combine private operation with public 
financing of investment appear to be the most sustainable option in many countries (Marin, 
2009).  
The number of projects in the transport sector represents near 27 percent of total PPI projects, 
but only 17 percent of the total investment. Near one half of this investment has gone into toll 
roads, with the rest into railways, seaports, and airports. These disparities are likely due to the 
different expected returns of the activities. While highways are usually seen as luxury goods 
in developing economies and so the tolls don’t face much opposition, the passenger railways, 
seaports and airports usually have subsidized tariffs, in the first case because transport by rail 
is traditionally associated to low cost of labour, and the other two because of an association 
with some sovereignty functions. This explains why freight railways, a less hot politically 
activity, has attracted more private investment than passenger railways. 
 
4.3. PPI Types 
Table 3 illustrates the relative importance of private involvement grouped in four main types 
of PPI in four sectors of infrastructures and public utilities and in regions of the developing 
world. For example, in the energy sector there were 1,587 PPIs with an investment of 369,939 
million USD. Greenfield projects represent 61.18 percent of total number of projects in this 
sector  and  the  majority  of  the  investment  (at  55.58  percent).  Unsurprisingly,  greenfield 
together with divestitures
13, represent 71.8 percent of the total number of PPIs, 86.1 percent of 
total investment. On average, while greenfield projects are the most frequent, both in number 
(53 per cent) and in cumulative investment (50 per cent), management and lease contracts are 
the  least  widespread  in  both  dimensions  (5  and  less  than  1  per  cent,  respectively).  In 
developing economies, greenfield projects are the ones that face the lowest opposition and 
even sometimes enthusiasm on the part of population because they are new projects with a 
high dimension and so they employ large amounts of labour force in the construction phase. 
Additionally, they are built and operated by the private sector, which takes on the commercial 
risk, and they are also projects that national and local governments like to exhibit as a sign of 
its venture capacity.  
 
                                                
13 By divestiture we mean that the assets of a public utility are totally or partially sold to the private sector.   13 
Table 3. 
Prevalence of PPI Types in sectors and regions 
Cumulative investment by sector 
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Source: Based on PPI Database. Note: figures in parenthesis are the corresponding value in project counts. 
 
On  the  other  hand,  management  arrangements,  which  usually  have  shorter  duration  than 
Greenfield projects, are sometimes used in situations of uncertain political environment and 
limited availability of baseline data, as is the case of the 4-year contract of the Gaza Strip in 
water and sewerage (see, Pessoa, 2008a). Lease arrangements are also sometimes used where 
uncertainty is high and, if succeeded, as a first step for a concession. It is the case of water 
supply  in  Conakry  and  16  other  towns  in  Guinea  (see  Pessoa,  2008a).  In  both  types  of 
arrangements  (management  and  lease)  as  the  public  entity  remains  responsible  for 
investments  while  the  commercial  risk  is  borne  by  private  sector,  the  asymmetry  of 
information, and consequent difficulty in enforcing any potential gains, can be a disincentive 
which helps to explain the low share of this type of PPI in the total investment.  
By sectors, greenfield  projects predominate in  energy  and telecom while concessions are 
prevalent in transport, and water and sewerage. Management and lease, clearly in minority in 
all sectors, have some importance in water and sewerage, both in number (17 per cent) and in 
volume of investment (3 per cent). This observation also confirms the above said about the 
difficulty in transferring public water and sewerage assets to the private sector. This also 
justifies why concessions are by far the most important form of PPI, not only in transport but   14 
also  in  the  water  and  sewerage  sectors,  both  in  number  of  projects  and  in  cumulative 
investment.  
Among the developing regions, LAC accounts for the great bulk of the cumulative investment 
in infrastructure. Latin America presents the largest share of concessions, both in number and 
in  total  investment.  Although  divestitures  have  occurred  more  frequently  in  ECA,  Latin 
America  presents  the  highest  volume  of  money  was  invested.  Greenfield  projects  were 
preferred in EAP. While contracts of Management and lease are evenly distributed by ECA, 
LAC and SSA, the small cumulative investment in this form of PPI is concentrated in ECA. 
Table 4 shows the importance of PPIs by sector and region. So, we can see that concessions 
correspond to 948 PPI projects with a cumulative investment of 165,689 millions of USD. It 
is also evident that 8.33 percent was invested in the energy sector, with this corresponding to 
10.86 percent of total concessions. 
 
Table 4. Importance of PPIs by sector and region 
  Type of PPI (in percent) 
Cumulative investment by sector 
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Cumulative investment by Region 























































Source: Based on PPI Database. Note: figures in parenthesis are the corresponding value in project counts. 
 
By region, policymakers appear to have a preference for greenfield projects, which allow new 
infrastructure to be built without necessarily having to embark on major structural reforms. 
Exceptions  are  found  only  in  Latin  America  and  ECA  where  divestitures  were  more 
widespread, reflecting major privatization programs in many countries in these regions. The 
greatest  prevalence  of  greenfield  projects  in  Asia  and  of  divestitures  in  the  volume  of   15 
investment in Latin America show that private investment has tended to complement public 
expenditure in Asia and replace it in Latin America. As a matter of fact, in Latin America 
private  participation  in  infrastructure  was  often  part  of  a  broader  reform  program  where 
divestitures and concessions of existing assets predominated in the cumulative investment in 
private infrastructure projects
14. In contrast to Latin America, the Asia region with higher 
average economic growth rates has focused on the creation of new assets through greenfield 
projects. As noted by Ferreira and Khatami (1996, p. 16), in Asia the promotion of private 
infrastructure was above all seen as a way of “complementing public sector efforts to keep 
pace with economic growth”. 
 
4.4. Distribution across countries and regions 
 
Table 5. Number of PPI projects and total investment, by income group, 1990-2007 
Income Group    Project Counts  Investment  Investment per project 
  Region  Number  Percent  Million USD  Percent   Million USD 
Low income  771  18.75  180,021  14.44  233.49 
   EAP  72  1.75  12,115  0.97  168.26 
   ECA  21  0.51  1,354  0.11  64.47 
   LAC  6  0.15  437  0.04  72.79 
   MENA  8  0.19  900  0.07  112.46 
   SA  390  9.49  124,879  10.02  320.20 
   SSA  274  6.67  40,337  3.24  147.22 
Lower middle income  1691  41.13  370,824  29.75  219.29 
  EAP  1084  26.37  215,050  17.26  198.39 
  ECA  103  2.51  19,743  1.58  191.68 
  LAC  353  8.59  70,166  5.63  198.77 
  MENA  98  2.38  60,182  4.83  614.10 
  SA  24  0.58  2,698  0.22  112.41 
  SSA  29  0.71  2,986  0.24  102.97 
Upper middle income  1649  40.11  695,423  55.80  421.72 
  EAP  97  2.36  50,204  4.03  517.57 
  ECA  579  14.08  208,534  16.73  360.16 
  LAC  895  21.77  406,190  32.59  453.84 
  MENA  16  0.39  3,477  0.28  217.29 
  SSA  62  1.51  27,019  2.17  435.79 
Total     4,111  100  1,246,268  100  303.15 
Source: Based on PPI database. 
 
                                                
14 As Ferreira and Khatami (1996) observe, if in Chile the infrastructure services were reformed owing to “the 
emerging  recognition  of  private  infrastructure’  advantages”,  mainly  in  other  Latin  American  countries,  like 
Argentina and Mexico, “infrastructure privatisation has often been used to generate revenues for government and 
retire external debt” (pp. 15-16)   16 
Although there are PPI projects in 140 out of 144 economies classified as developing ones by 
the World Bank, PPI projects are not evenly distributed across regions and across countries. 
Table 5 summarises the volume of investments and the number of projects for the 1990-2007 
period. It shows in fact that, while the 50 low-income countries have registered 771 projects, 
the 53 lower-middle income economies more than doubled such amount with 1691 projects, a 
number that slightly exceeds the value registered by the 37 upper-middle-income countries. 
Moreover, the dimension of the projects varies with the level of development, with higher 
investments on average located in upper-middle-income countries, as is apparent in table 5. 
Even though almost all developing countries have used some form of private investment in 
infrastructures since 1990, private investors have tended to be directed to a small group of 
developing countries: the ones with relatively large, rich or fast-growing markets. Table 6 
shows  the  top  12  countries  with  highest  number  of  PPI  on  the  left  side  and  the  top  12 
destinations  for  investment  in  infrastructures  in  developing  economies  in  the  1990-2007 
period, indicating a high concentration in both number and cumulative investment.  
 
Table 6. 
Top 12 of private sector involvement by country, 1990-2007 
Ranking by number of PPI projects  Ranking by investment 
Country  Project counts  Per cent  Country  Million USD   Per cent 
China  805  19.58  Brazil  196,308  15.63 
Brazil  328  7.98  China  99,953  7.96 
Russian Federation  310  7.54  Mexico  86,126  6.86 
India  306  7.44  Malaysia  50,204  4.00 
Argentina  193  4.69  Philippines  42,243  3.36 
Mexico  176  4.28  Indonesia  40,676  3.24 
Colombia  132  3.21  Turkey  36,851  2.93 
Chile  107  2.60  Thailand  31,954  2.54 
Thailand  96  2.34  Poland  31,853  2.54 
Malaysia  96  2.34  Hungary  27,111  2.16 
Philippines  88  2.14  Chile  26,291  2.09 
Indonesia  87  2.12  South Africa  25,341  2.02 
Top 12  2,724  66.26  Top 12  694,911  55.34% 
Source: Based on PPI database. 
 
The 12 countries presented on the left side of table 6 justify roughly two thirds of the total 
number of projects, and absorb 55 per cent of the investment. To sum up, Latin America 
accounted  for  the  great  bulk  of  the  cumulative  investment  in  infrastructure.  Two  Latin   17 
American countries (Brazil and Mexico) account for more than one fifth of the total PPP 
investment in the developing world. However, the countries and regions that have absorbed 
the greatest bulk of investment are not the ones that need the most in terms of reducing the 
development gap.  
As table 7 shows, the access to improved water sources is particularly low in SSA. However, 
this region together with SA have profited the least from PPI investment in the water and 
sewerage sector. As is visible from table 7, only 0.47 percent of the total investment in water 
and sewerage was spent in SSA in the 1990-2007 period. There is also a clear paucity of 
Telecoms in SA and SSA, where land line and mobile phone subscribers are respectively, 26 
and 25, per 1,000 people. However, of the total investment in telecom only 8.2 percent was 
applied in SSA and 10.45 percent in SA. Respecting to paved roads the two regions with 
lowest percent, EAP and SSA, have different performances: while EAP benefited from 35.17 
percent, SSA have only absorbed 1.86 percent of total investment
15. So, a first conclusion can 
be drawn: the PPI investment was directed not to countries that need the most but to countries 
and regions that are more attractive to foreign investment. 
 
Table 7. 
Some key indicators of developing economies 



































Roads  Telecom  Water and 
sewerage 
Region:                     
EAP   4,969  175  4.5  66  11.4  67  87  35.17  12.75  49.47 
ECA   11,262  156  13.0  89  …  121  95  6.32  24.90  7.16 
LAC   9,678  107  12.2  78  22.0  85  91  46.65  37.07  40.82 
MENA   7,402  29  56.1  77  81.0  68  89  0.10  6.66  1.62 
SA   2,532  30  6.8  33  56.9  26  87  9.89  10.45  0.45 
SSA  1,870  29  44.2  31  11.9  25  58  1.86  8.17  0.47 
Sources: Based on World Bank (2009) and PPI database. 
 
5. When the third P drops: Cancellations and Projects under distress 
When the third P drops, that is, when the partnership is broken, three factors acquire particular 
relevance:  the  increase  in  transaction  costs,  the  emergence  of  termination  risk  and  the 
decrease  in  PPPs  trust.  All  three  factors  must  be  considered  in  evaluating  the  PPI 
performance.  
                                                
15 According Yepes et al. (2009), Africa has the worst infrastructure endowment of any developing region today, 
particularly with respect to electrical generating capacity.  
   18 
One  important  indicator  of  the  failure  of  a  PPP  is  the  degree  of  dissatisfaction  of  the 
populations  covered  by  such  arrangement.  Sometimes  this  disappointment  causes  the 
unexpected end of the PPI. However, the cessation before the contractual end of the PPI 
project  usually  results  from  divergences  between  partners.  These  divergences  owe  to  a 
multitude  of  factors  but  they  always  hint  at  problems  in  the  design  of  the  contractual 
arrangement or in its functioning conditions. The existence of such problems is likely to 
increase the transaction costs and so to reduce the effectiveness of PPPs over the traditional 
way of procurement.  
One important feature of the PPP way of providing for infrastructure is the correct allocation 
of risks, which must be ex-ante identified. The superiority of the PPP way over the traditional 
public provision implies a comparison of risks. But there is a risk in PPP procurement, which 
is not applied to traditional public procurement: the termination risk (EIB, 2005). This risk is 
borne  both  by  the  public  partners  and  the  private  partners.  It  is  the  risk  that  the  PPP 
arrangement will be terminated early, either through private partner financial failing or by 
private partner failure to perform technically, e.g., by not providing the contracted service 
adequately
16. This is a risk for the private sector partners, as they will almost certainly suffer a 
material financial loss on termination. However, it is also a risk for the public sector partners: 
they will still need to arrange for the service to be provided after the termination, based on the 
available project. The risk can be partially mitigated by selecting suitable bidders. However, 
these are long-term contracts and there is a trend for the original technical members of a 
consortium  to  be  displaced  by  purely  financial  investors  that  may  not  have  the  relevant 
experience  and  expertise.  Public  partner  failure,  on  the  other  hand,  may  owe  to  an 
inappropriate allocation of risk from the beginning. Whatever the situation, termination before 
the  contractual  end  is  always  a  factor  that  increases  the  costs  or  decreases  the  potential 
benefits of PPPs. 
The trust in PPP policy can also be negatively influenced if partners of the private sector leave 
infrastructure projects before the contract ends. The confidence reduction can also happen 
when projects face problems that put them under distress. Such problems can have impact 
both on the private sector’s confidence and on the government’s self-belief in the robustness 
and  “value  for  money”  of  arrangements  similar  to  the  distressed  ones.  In  both  cases 
                                                
16 Most cases of early termination of contracts involved significant disobedience with contractual responsibilities 
on one or on both sides (Marin, 2009), followed by a degradation of the partners’ relationship to the point that 
ending the partnership is the chosen solution. When PPPs end after having been in place for many years, its 
anticipated end usually reflects difficulties in adapting the contract over time to changing conditions (Marin, 
2009).   19 
uncertainty emerges, and it becomes more difficult to correctly assess the value of PPPs over 
other alternatives.  
However, besides the increased costs and problems affecting the evaluation of projects, the 
relative  importance  of  the  number  of  projects  and  volume  of  investment  involved  in 
cancellations  is  an  important  indicator  on  the  prospects  of  policy  based  on  PPIs  and 
particularly on the interest of investors. As is recognized by the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB, 2009), project cancellations have affected the interest of international investors and 
operators in PPI. Table 8 shows the number and the total investment of projects cancelled
17 
and  under  distress
18  compared  with  the  total  number  and  investment  on  PPIs  reaching 
financial closure, in developing regions.  
 
Table 8. 
Importance of projects cancelled or under distress, 1990-2007 
Projects reaching financial closure  Projects cancelled or under 
distress 
Region:  Number of 
countries 
with private 








EAP  18  1253  $277,368  70  $30,663 
ECA  26  703  $231,331  21  $3,788 
LAC  29  1254  $479,844  118  $48,955 
MENA  13  122  $66,858  6  $1,017 
SA  8  414  $127,577  7  $3,930 
SSA  46  365  $72,635  31  $1,890 
Total  140  4,111  $1,255,613  253  $90,243 
Source: Based on PPI database. 
 
According to data presented in table 8, 253 projects of a total 4,111 reported by the PPI 
database as reaching financial closure in 1990–2007 were canceled or under distress by 2007. 
Those accounted for 6.2 percent of all projects and 7.19 percent of investment commitments, 
with  a  significantly  contribution  of  EAP  (11.1  percent)  and  LAC  (10.2  percent)  in  the 
cancelled or distressed investment. However, the principal problem is that in the latest six 
years an increasing trend in cancellations has been observed: the rate of private sector exit has 
increased  more  than  twice,  between  2001  and  2007,  representing  a  high  increase  in  the 
                                                
17 A project is considered to have been canceled if, before the end of the contract period, the private company 
sold  or  transferred  its  economic  interest  in  the  project  to  the  public  sector;  the  private  company  physically 
abandoned the project (such as withdrawing all staff); or the private company ceased operation or closed down 
construction for 15 percent or more of the license or concession period, following the revocation of the license or 
repudiation of the contract. See Harris et al. (2003). 
18 Although PPI database distinguishes between cancellations and distressed projects defining these as projects 
“in  which  the  government  or  the  operator  has  requested  contract  termination  or  that  are  in  international 
arbitration”, for our purposes we consider that both are an indicator of problems in PPI.   20 
cancellation  rate.  In  fact,  Harris  et  al.  (2003)  found  that  for  the  1990–2001  period  the 
corresponding figures were only 1.9 percent of all projects and 3.2 percent of all investment 
commitments. This increasing rate of cancellations as time elapses is likely to have negative 
effects on the popularity of these instruments and shows that the return to the euphoria of the 
first seven years of 1990s will not be easy.  
Sometimes difficulties in public-private partnership projects with impacts on the cancellation 
rate  can  be  the  outcome  of  macroeconomic  shocks.  Toll  road  projects  in  Mexico,  water 
projects in Argentina, and power generation projects in Indonesia, all of which suffered from 
macroeconomic  shocks  occurring  in  these  countries  at  different  times,  contributed 
significantly to the list of canceled PPI projects. In fact, the financial crisis increased the cost, 
and  reduced  the  availability  of  project  financing,  which  had  likely  implications  on  the 
cancellation rate. In addition, financial crises have usually led to the renegotiation of many 
contracts.  For  instance,  it  was  estimated  that  the  Asian  financial  crisis  drove  to  the 
renegotiation of 71 per cent of contracts in East Asia (Reside Jr., 2008).  
However, often the problems can be endogenous, that is, they can result from the behavior of 
the partners, as for example, the aggressive bidding of the private sector or failures in the 
design of the policy instruments, including bad project or concession design. Several cases of 
early termination can be traced to contracts whose design was not viable or whose bidding 
process led to unrealistic financial conditions, or both. An example is Cochabamba (Bolivia), 
where the contract was awarded following a tender from which all but one consortium had 
withdrawn. Substantial tariff rises were needed to turn the large investment required from the 
private operator viable, something that proved socially unsustainable and brought about the 




In this chapter we have tried to review the PPP performance in developing economies, using 
data of World Development Indicators and of the PPI database, for the 1990-2007 period. 
Some points deserve consideration. 
First,  the  current  wave  of  PPPs  in  developing  economies  was  not  determined  by  an 
endogenous  process.  On  the  contrary,  it  was  due  to  a  coincidence  of  interests  between 
                                                
19 As Graeme Hodge remembered me, this is probably the most high profile failure in water privatisation. A 
consortium  controlled  by  U.S.  multinational  Bechtel,  signed  a  40-year  deal  to  increase  water  supplies  and 
services to Cochabamba, but six months later, rioting Bolivians chased the company out of the country.   21 
international organizations that shared the view of the Washington Consensus and a set of 
countries notably in  LAC
20 that have considered divestiture the best way to alleviate the 
public deficit constraints (for instance, Argentina, Mexico). This coincidence explains the 
huge increase both in the number of PPI projects and in the volume of investment from 1990 
to 1997 while it highlights, at least partially, the high volume of investment in PPIs in energy 
and telecommunications, sectors where divestiture was more extensive. 
Second, data reveal a picture of concentration. Two in six regions are responsible for 60 
percent of the total investment in PPI projects: LAC and EAP with 38 per cent and 22 per cent 
of total investment, respectively. We also observe that within these regions investments are 
neither evenly distributed across countries nor are the least developed countries those that 
benefit the most. On the contrary, 12 in a total of 140 developing economies with PPI projects 
are  responsible  for  the  absorption  of  55  per  cent  of  the  investment  in  PPPs.  These  are 
countries with relatively large, rich or fast-growing markets, characteristics that always attract 
foreign investment. On the other hand, the poorest economies, notably in SSA, to which the 
privatization receipt of Washington Consensus was also blindly applied (Nellis, 2003), went 
on increasing the development gap. 
Third, if, as is frequently advocated by international organizations, the advantage of the PPIs, 
results  from  the  capacity  of  this  type  of  procurement  to  reduce the infrastructure gap  in 
developing economies we can only conclude that the target was not attained. What is apparent 
is that Governments used private sector involvement to provide infrastructure projects as they 
see  PPPs  as  a  quicker  way  than  other  alternatives  to  have  infrastructure  in  place.  But, 
although PPPs may be attractive to governments, as they allow a reduction — and often delay 
— of government expenditures in infrastructure investments, certain PPP types effectively 
create (off-budget) future liabilities. 
Fourth,  there  is  some  disenchantment  about  the  capacity  of  PPI  policy  to  overcome  the 
existent big gaps between high-income countries and developing economies. This is visible in 
the fact that after 1997 the increase trend of PPI projects both in number and in amount of 
investment never reached the earlier rate. Furthermore, the yearly amount of investment in 
PPI projects has never recovered the value achieved in 1997. This disillusionment is also 
                                                
20 According to the World Bank (1995) the revenues from divestiture in developing economies, from 1988 to 
1993,  amount  to  0.1,  2.0,  7.4,  and  22.5  billions  of  US  dollars,  in  Africa,  ECA,  Asia  and  Latin  America, 
respectively.   22 
visible  in  the  increasing  amount  of  investment  that  corresponds  to  cancelled  and  under 
distress projects. 
Fifth, the results of a PPP policy must also be evaluated in a dynamic perspective. A high 
interconnection  between  foreign  companies  and  domestic  firms  has  resulted,  and  this 
interrelationship has allowed some expansion and upgrading of domestic firms in developing 
economies. As is shown by Marin (2009), while in 2000 five international water companies 
accounted for about 80 percent of the water PPP market in developing countries, by 2007 28 
large private operators from developing countries, were in place, each serving a combined 
population of at least 400,000 people, totaling about 40 percent of the market. 
Sixth, international organizations use to say that PPPs, if structured as they should be, could 
in reality be the most effective and fastest way of improving utility performance. For instance, 
the Asian Development Bank is very explicit in this regard: "The challenge in introducing 
PPPs is to make political leaders at all levels understand that PPP, if structured properly, 
could indeed be the most effective and fastest way of improving utility performance, and the 
quality and reliability of services provided” (ADB, 2009, p. 33). The continuing advocacy of 
international  organizations  may  be  enough  for  the  stream  of  PPI  projects  to  goes  on. 
However, the appropriate conditions in most of these economies are lacking. As the same 
organizations recognize these economies are characterized by a “lack of institutional capacity, 
weak  governance  systems,  and  unclear  or  unsuitable  rules  and  regulations,  all  of  which 
increase transaction costs and risks” (ADB, 2009, p. 4). 
Therefore, a crucial issue for the future is how to provide institutional capacity, how to build 
strong governance systems and how to increase the rule of law in the majority of developing 
economies.  This  is  a  huge  agenda  to  tackle  and  it  probably  depends  on  the  countries’ 
economic growth. In the meanwhile, poor people in poorer countries caught in poverty traps 
need to be served and the rationale underling the PPI approach cannot give a positive answer 
to these people. Here, the government and the ODA must play a more extensive role than they 
have played since the emergence of the PPP fashion. Especially, the ODA cannot be limited 
to enhance the quality and raise the profitability of PPI projects.  
Furthermore, the way international organizations look at the development policy is important. 
The  substitution  of  the  Washington  Consensus  for  the  recommendations  of  the  Spence 
Commission (World Bank, 2008) is a first step in the right direction. For the great bulk of 
developing economies the means used to provide social and infrastructure services in future   23 
depend on the way governments and multilateral organizations will regard the development 
policy. If the rationale of the Spence Commission is capable of substituting the confident 
assertions  of  the  Washington  Consensus  and  simultaneously  avoid  both  market 
fundamentalism and institutional fundamentalism, it is likely that new forms of relationship 
between public and private sectors will emerge, forms that avoid episodes like Cochabamba 
and other abundant but less visible episodes in the media in the poor regions of developing 
economies. 
This chapter was also supposed to focus also on ‘getting the right balance’ between PPPs and 
other alternatives. In a developing economy a PPI is not limited to having one partner of the 
public sector and another partner of the private sector, but the private sector involving several 
agents and organizations: one or a consortium of foreign companies linked to domestic firms 
usually subcontracted, commercial banks and multilateral organizations. Given the lack of 
institutional capacity, governments need to rely on multilateral organizations for advice and 
technical assistance but the organizations that assist governments are the same that provide 
credit to the companies that build, manage and operate the infrastructure. The way this critical 
role is played will be fundamental to the credibility of the PPI approach in the future. 
Given the huge technological change in the infrastructure sector in the last two decades, 
developing  economies  cannot  overlook  foreign  participation  in  building  and  managing 
infrastructure. The critical challenge to a developing economy is how to use such participation 
to  learn  and  consequently  to  increase  domestic  production  and  management  capacity. 
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￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿ ￿ 4￿￿ % ￿ #￿￿5 ￿ ! 6 2 ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿7 ￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿#￿8￿ ￿ ￿ 9￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿
+ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿- ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿.￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿& ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿7 ￿ ￿ ￿ 4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿’ ￿ ￿
: ￿#￿ ￿ ￿; ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿  ￿ 1 ￿ 7 ￿ ￿￿ ￿#! ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ % ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿<￿ ￿<1 ￿ ￿ 2 ￿￿￿￿/ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿0
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿0￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿7 ￿ ￿ ￿ 4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿
$ ￿ % ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿<￿ ￿<1 ￿ ￿ 2 ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿7 ￿ ￿ ￿ 4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿’ ￿ ￿
$ ￿ % ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿<￿ ￿<1 ￿ ￿ 2 ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿, ￿ #￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿) ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿1 ￿￿￿7 ￿ ￿ ￿ 4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿3 (￿
, ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ #￿  ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿￿￿/ ￿2 ￿￿ ￿￿￿& ￿￿3 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿% ￿ ￿4 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿
5 ￿& ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ 6 - / ￿7￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿7 ￿ ￿ ￿ 4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿3 * ￿
/ ￿ ￿ & ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿$ ￿ % ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿<￿ ￿<1 ￿ ￿ 2 ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿% ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿& ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
( ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿& ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿/ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿7 ￿ ￿ ￿ 4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿3 . ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿) ￿ ￿ ￿￿8 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿  ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
7 ￿ ￿ ￿ 4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿3 ￿￿
; ￿ > #￿￿ ￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿’ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿9 ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ 0) ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿5 ￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2 ￿ 4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿3 ’ ￿
￿ ￿ 6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ 2 ￿￿ = ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ #￿  ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ #￿ ￿1 ￿￿ #￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
( ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿/ ￿& ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿.￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2 ￿ 4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿3 3 ￿
)￿￿ - ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿! ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿* $ % ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿.- ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2 ￿ 4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿3 ￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ #￿￿0 #￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ #￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿? #￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ #￿￿￿, ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿7￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2 ￿ 4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿3 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿! ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿, ￿ #￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ #￿  ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿& ￿0& ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2 ￿ 4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿3 ￿￿
$ ￿ #￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿ ￿ & ￿￿ 2 ￿ #￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿ #￿￿￿￿/ ￿, ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿; ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿& ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿& ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿/ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿’ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2 ￿ 4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿3 ￿ ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿ ￿ & ￿￿ 2 ￿ #￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿; ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
- ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿9 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿( ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ 2 ￿ 4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿￿(￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 4￿ ￿ ￿￿/ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿, ￿ #￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿5 ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿￿* ￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ #￿￿0 #￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ #￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿? #￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ #￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿< ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿7￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿5 ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿￿. ￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿ - ￿ #￿￿$ ￿ % ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿<￿ ￿<1 ￿ ￿ 2 ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿7 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿; ￿￿ ##￿ ￿ ￿￿￿* ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿5 ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿ ￿)￿" ￿ ￿ ￿￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿/ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿& ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿; ￿￿0- = ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿* $ % ￿.￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿ @ ! ￿ 4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ #! ￿ ￿ ￿￿1 ￿￿ ! ￿ #￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ > ￿9 ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿1 ￿ @ ! ￿ 4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿
)￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿#￿7 ￿ ￿ ￿ #￿  ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿5 ￿ ￿ 2 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿( ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿( ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿1 ￿ @ ! ￿ 4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ; ￿ ￿ ￿ > ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ #￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿; ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿1 ￿￿ ! ￿ #￿￿￿￿￿￿ " ￿￿￿￿￿? ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿8 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿1 ￿5 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ - ￿ #! ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
, ￿A ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ 4￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ )￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ ￿ 2 ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿- ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿￿ ￿ #￿￿￿& ￿￿￿" ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿0￿/ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿! @ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿( ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿- ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ - ￿ #! ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ #! + ￿ ￿ ￿￿  ￿#! ￿ #￿ 1 ￿ " ￿ ￿; ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿1 ￿ ￿ 2 ￿￿￿￿- ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿/ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿- ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿1 ￿9 ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ # ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿? & ￿￿￿￿￿￿ 8 ￿￿ ￿￿* ￿￿￿.￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿’ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿ - ￿ #! ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ @ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿: ￿ ￿ ￿ #￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿: ￿ ￿: ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿- ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿9 ￿￿￿
￿￿2 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿3 ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ - ￿ #! ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿￿ (￿
￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ##￿ ￿￿￿￿5 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿/ ￿￿ ￿( ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿- ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿- ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿
5 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿% ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿A￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿( ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿, ￿￿￿ ￿1 ￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿￿ * ￿
$ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ 4￿ ￿ ￿ 2 ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿& ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿￿ . ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)￿" ￿ ￿ ￿￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ - ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿0 #￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ #￿ ￿￿￿- = ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿( ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
% ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿% ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿ 4￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿ 2 ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿0 #￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ #￿ ￿￿￿A￿￿ ￿ ￿￿( ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿1 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿  ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ’ ￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿  ￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿7 ￿ ￿￿ ￿#! ￿ ￿ ￿￿$ ￿ % ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿<￿ ￿<1 ￿ ￿ 2 ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿#￿ ￿￿ ￿)￿ ##￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿0￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿￿ 3 ￿
)￿￿ ! ￿￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿, ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿7 ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿  ￿ ￿)￿ ￿)￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ #￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ #￿￿
￿* ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿) ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿- ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿$ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
0 #￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ #￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿)￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ = ￿ 4@ #￿ ￿ ￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿< ￿& ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿( ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿, ￿ #￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿￿￿9 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿
￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿1 ￿￿ 4￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ! + ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿  ￿ ￿￿ ￿ % ￿ ￿￿￿+ ￿  ￿￿, ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿+ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿- ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿/ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿
)￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ #￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿1 ￿￿ 4￿ ￿ ! ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿* ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿< ￿/ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿& ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿0( ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ @ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿￿(￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿$ ￿ #￿ ￿1 ￿ A ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿* $ % ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿)￿￿ ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿￿* ￿
$ ￿ #￿ ￿1 ￿ A ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿/ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿* $ % ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ + - ￿& ￿( ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿)￿￿ ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿￿. ￿
$ ￿ % ￿ ￿; ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿)￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿)￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿)￿￿ ! ￿ ￿ #￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿, ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿& ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
- ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿)￿￿ ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
B #! ￿ ￿ ￿/ ￿ 4￿ #￿￿ ￿￿1 ￿ ￿ 2 ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿% ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿1 ￿/ ￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿? ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ 8 ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿< ￿B C D C 0
E F F G ￿￿￿)￿￿ ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿￿’ ￿
)6 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿)￿ ￿1 ￿ ￿ 2 ￿￿￿￿/ ￿.￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿, ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿6 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿-   ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿< ￿
/ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿& ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿6 ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿-   ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿)￿￿ ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
￿￿￿￿￿3 ￿
)￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿; ￿ @ ￿ #￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿5 ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿)￿￿ ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ ￿ (￿
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